Présentation de Aleksandr Karpov , Higher School of Economics
![[Séminaire CREM] Hotelling-Downs Equilibria : Moving Beyond Plurality Variants.](https://cibul.s3.amazonaws.com/1f2d2e3992834ce4a8adb1aef243cc0e.base.image.jpg)
Mardi 2 mai, 14h15
UFR SEGGAT - MRSH - Université de Caen Normandie
**Résumé :** Hotelling-Downs model is a classic model of political competition and strategizing candidates, almost always analyzed under plurality. Our paper presents a three-pronged development of the Hotelling-Downs model. First, we analyze competition under a variety of voting rules. Second, we consider not only a linear city model, but also a circular city model. Third, unlike most Hotelling-Downs papers, we solve the model under the winner-takes-all assumption, which saves many equilibria, and is more relevant to voting settings. In the case of three and four candidates we have found a measure of the set of equilibria. _Joint work with Omer Lev, and Svetlana Obraztsova_